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ARTICLE
HOW TO SUE WITHOUT STANDING:
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CITIZEN
SUITS IN NON-ARTICLE III TRIBUNALS
David Krinskyt
ABSTRACT

In recent years, the "injury-in-fact" standing
requirement of Article III has frequently impeded attempts by concerned citizens and public interest
groups to challenge government actions in federal
court.
This article proposes a way in which "citizen
suits"-lawsuits brought by plaintiffs who wish to
challenge perceived illegalities that affect the public
as a whole-can be given a federal forum. It argues
that, with some limitations, Congress has authority to
authorize pure citizen suits in Article I tribunals and
discusses the (surmountable) obstacles that such fora
pose.
After discussing the constitutionality of citizen suits in Article I tribunals, the article then turns to
precedents that shed light on how such tribunals
might function. It highlights two, one in the United
States, one abroad. In the United States, the advisory
opinions of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims are a little-known example of "cases" without standing in an
t J.D., summa cum laude, Georgetown University Law Center, 2005; A.B. in Physics,
cum laude, Harvard College, 1999. The author is a law clerk to the Honorable Richard Linn of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and a former law clerk to the Honorable
Roger W. Titus of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The opinions presented
herein are those of neither judge, but of the author alone. Special thanks are due to Professor
Vicki Jackson and to Augusta Ridley.
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Article I tribunal today. In Australia-which, though
it obviously follows a different constitution with different requirements, has a government similar in
structure to the United States'-the Administrative
Appeals Tribunal is a model for how generalized
grievances with government affairs might be aired in
a court-like setting.
In short, the U.S. Constitution permits citizen
suits-just not in Article I courts.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Modern Law of Standing
The past few decades have seen a dramatic tightening of the requirements for standing to sue in federal court.1 In particular, the Supreme Court's decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife ushered in a
new era in which Article III limits the power of Congress to grant
members of the general public a right to sue.2 Perhaps because standing is a concern that is most vexing when an issue affects the public at
large, this era has also seen standing arise as a potential problem in a
variety of legal disputes that have captured national attention, including challenges to the Bush administration's wiretapping programs,3
global warming, 4 and the constitutionality of public-school recitations
of the Pledge of Allegiance. 5
Although Lujan was not the first Supreme Court case to exhibit a
heightened concern for standing requirements,6 and its effects have
I See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and
Article 111, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 168-97 (1992) (summarizing the history of American standing
law and tracing the development of the modem "injury-in-fact" requirement to the 1960s and
1970s).
2 504 U.S. 555, 571-73 (1992). Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, held that the Environmental Protection Act's "citizen-suit" provision, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g), cannot grant "any
person" the power to file suit in federal court. The relevant provision of the EPA provides that
"any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf ... to enjoin any person, including
the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency.., who is alleged to be
in violation of any provision of this chapter."
3 See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, The Volokh Conspiracy-The NSA Eavesdropping Opinion
and Standing, Aug. 17, 2006, http:l/www.volokh.comlposts/l 155856278.shtml.
4 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2960
(June 26, 2006). Standing thus promises to be a major issue in one of the most significant decisions of the Supreme Court's 2006 Term.
s Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (dismissing First
Amendment challenge to the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance's "under God" language on
the grounds that the affected child's father lacked standing).
6 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); see also Sunstein, supra note 1, at 19395 (discussing pre-Lujan cases that examined standing as a distinct inquiry from the presence of
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been mitigated significantly by the Court's decision in Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.,7 Lujan was the
first case to clearly enunciate, as a matter of constitutional import, the
8
current "injury-in-fact" test for standing.
Under this test, plaintiffs wishing to challenge government action
must not only have a substantive cause of action under which they are
entitled to bring suit, but as a threshold matter, they must have suffered an injury-in-fact: "an invasion of a legally protected interest
which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical." 9 Moreover, this injury-in-fact must
have been caused by the conduct complained of, and it must be "likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed"
should the court rule for the plaintiff.' °
Citizen suit plaintiffs such as those in Lujan do not generally meet
these requirements. Members of the general public are not concretely
or particularly injured simply because they perceive executive action
or inaction as contrary to law, nor are they concretely and particularly
injured if they believe that a private party is not in compliance with
regulation. 1 Even if a personalized injury is threatened, the "actual or
imminent" requirement means that only sufficiently likely threats are
serious enough to be judicially cognizable. Mere remote possibilities
of harm to the plaintiff are insufficient. 12 And even though Laidlaw
held that this requirement would not preclude injuries based on perceived, rather than actual risks,' 3 standing still requires that the perceived injury be to the plaintiffs in particular. 4 The requirement of
standing to sue is constitutional in stature: "a plaintiff raising only a
generally available grievance about government-claiming only harm
to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Consti-- does not state an Article II case or controtution and laws .

a cause of action).
7 528 U.S. 167 (2000). Laidlaw held that even though a group of plaintiffs could not
demonstrate that they, their land, or their environment had been physically harmed in any way,
they had standing because their fears of health risks had diminished their use and enjoyment of
the North Tyger River, the alleged pollution of which was at issue. Id. at 181-83, 187-88.
8 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
9 Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
10 Id. at 560-61 (quotations and citations omitted).
I See id. at 562-63.
12See La. Envtl. Action Network v. Browner, 87 F.3d 1379, 1384 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
13 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 187-88

(2000).
14 Cf. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (holding that a plaintiff lacked
standing to enjoin enforcement of a police chokehold policy because he could not demonstrate
that he personally was likely to be injured by it in the future).
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of a
versy. " 5 Even an explicit statutory grant to the general public
6
right to sue, as was present in Lujan, cannot grant standing.1
Both Lujan and Laidlaw arose in the environmental context,17 and
environmental statutes have been the paradigmatic examples of con-8
gressional attempts to grant causes of action to the general public.'
However, in addition to environmental law and to the examples cited
above, 19 standing has been a barrier to suits challenging government
action or inaction in a wide variety of other fields, including treatment
of individuals with disabilities, 20 initiation of child support proceedings, 2 1 tax policy, 22 and discrimination in local zoning ordinances.

23

A

constitutional limitation on congressional power to confer standing
therefore poses a general constraint on Congress's power to craft enforcement schemes for its regulatory programs. Although such nonadjudicatory mechanisms as notice-and-comment rulemaking are still
available to politically-interested but not injured-in-fact citizens who
wish to weigh in on regulatory matters,24 such mechanisms have their
disadvantages. 25 In particular, these non-adjudicatory mechanisms are
most capable of providing a forum for citizen input when an executive agency is considering regulations of its own accord, but less so
when a citizen wishes to challenge action or inaction under existing,
static regulations. 26 What Lujan has done is narrow the range of alternative mechanisms that Congress can impose; Lujan restricts the
15 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74.

id. at 571-73; see also supra note 2.
See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 557-58; Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 175-78; see also Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and Environmental Protection, 12 DUKE ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y F. 39 (2001).
18 According to Professor Sunstein, writing shortly after Lujan was decided, every major
environmental statute then in force except FIFRA contained a citizen suit provision. Sunstein,
supranote 1, at 165 n.il.
19See supra notes 3 and 5 and accompanying text.
20 See, e.g., DeLil v. El Torito Rests., Inc., No. C 94-3900, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22788
(N.D. Cal. June 24, 1997) (barring a plaintiff from suing over a restaurant's illegally locked
wheelchair lift because suggestion that the plaintiff might return was speculative); see also
16 See
17

Elizabeth Keadle Markey, Note, The ADA's Last Stand?: Standing and the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 185 (2002).
21 Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
22 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.
26 (1976).
23 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
24 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.),
N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 741 (1996) (describing notice-and-comment rulemaking as a mechanism

for "assurting] due deliberation" in the creation of new or modified regulations).
25 See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrarinessand Legitimacy
in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 461, 484 n.109 (2003) (surveying the literature
on the "ossification" of the agency rulemaking process that some scholars have blamed on
lengthy and cumbersome notice-and-comment procedures).
26 See id. at 481-84 (describing notice-and-comment rulemaking as an "idealized legislative process" intended in part to make the enactment of new regulations more majoritarian).
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availability of judicial review in Article III federal courts to those
situations where some party with the ability and inclination to sue has
suffered a redressable injury-in-fact. Congress, however, may wish
to take advantage of the agency-external, plaintiff-initiated legal system as a check on executive action and make this system available at
a stage of agency action during which injuries are still hypothetical.2 8
For instance, where an environmental statute protects against longterm harm, by the time an individual plaintiff has standing under Lujan, it may be too late to mitigate the harm. Congress may also wish
to permit citizen enforcement of a statute whose benefits are intended
to accrue to society generally. Indeed, if citizen suits in non-Article
III tribunals are possible, and Congress is free to establish these tribunals with more flexible procedures than the Article EIl courts are
equipped to provide,29 such tribunals might provide a suitable forum
for the adjudication of complex, "polycentric" regulatory disputes that
some scholars have suggested ordinary courts are ill-equipped to handle.3 °
At least one commentator, writing before Lujan, has suggested that
non-Article III judicial bodies-such as Article I "legislative
courts"-might serve as a forum for hearing citizen suits. 31 The purpose of this article is to explore whether Article I courts might indeed
provide a way, consistent with Lujan, for Congress to provide for
these kinds of judicial challenges to government action or inaction.
B. Article I Courts: A Solution?
It is well-established-through long practice if not always coherent theory32-that Congress has the power to create Article I courts to

27 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 564 & n.2 (1992) (discussing "actual or imminent" harm requirement).
28 See Robert B. June, Citizen Suits: The Structure of Standing Requirementsfor Citizen
Suits and the Scope of CongressionalPower, 24 ENVTL. L. 761, 764-65 (1994) (describing
Congress's motivations for augmenting the Clean Air Act with a citizen suit provision, as well
as some of the ways in which Congress-by legislative means rather than standing requirements-limited the availability of citizen suits to minimize frivolous litigation).
29See infra Part HI (discussing the flexible procedures available in both Court of Federal
Claims advisory cases and in the Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal).
30 See Lon L. Fuller, The Formsand Limits of Adjudication,92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978)
(arguing that the traditional adversarial system is ill-equipped to handle problems, called "polycentric," with complicated effects on a multiplicity of parties).
31 James Dumont, Beyond Standing: Proposalsfor CongressionalResponse to Supreme
Court "Standing" Decisions, 13 VT. L. RFV. 675,684-89 (1989).
32See Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative
Courts UnderArticle 111, 65 IND. L.J. 233,239 (1990) ("The Supreme Court opinions devoted to
the subject of the validity of legislative and administrative tribunals are as troubled, arcane,
confused and confusing as could be imagined.").
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hear certain classes of disputes.33 The literature of the federal courts is
rich with examinations of the degree to which the judicial power can
be extended to these non-Article III tribunals. 34 Much of the concern
over extending judicial power to non-Article III tribunals stems from
the uncertainty surrounding whether, or when, Congress may withdraw from the jurisdiction of Article III courts-and assign to some
non-Article III federal decision maker--cases that fall within the jurisdictional heads of Article Ell, which does place at least some uncertain constraints on the power of Congress to invest judicial power in
non-Article Ill bodies.35 In the words of Justice O'Connor, Article RI
"serves both to protect the role of the independent judiciary within the
constitutional scheme" and "to safeguard litigants' right to have
claims decided before judges who are free from potential domination
by other branches of government., 36 At the same time, Article lII is
not absolute. 37 At a minimum, Congress can assign disputes on specialized topics within the reach of its substantive lawmaking powers
to non-Article II1 administrative decision makers, at least if the decisions are subject to judicial review and/or enforcement and the disputes are related to a comprehensive federal program, even if parts of
them arise under state law.3 8 It can also assign appropriate cases to
territorial courts39 and military tribunals, n° and can create courts to
adjudicate so-called "public rights" disputes. 4'
However, Article I citizen suit tribunals pose a different problem.
They would probably not constitute a withdrawal of Article III jurisdiction in the first place because citizen suits involve, by their very
nature, a plaintiff who has no Article III "case.2 The question, then,
33 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 63-64 (1982);
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1855).
34 E.g., Bator, supra note 32; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative
Agencies, and Article 111, 101 HARv. L. REv. 915 (1988); Daniel J. Meltzer, Legislative Courts,
Legislative Power, and the Constitution, 65 IND. L.J. 291 (1990); Judith Resnick, "Uncle Sam
Modernizes His Justice": Inventing the FederalDistrict Courts of the Twentieth Centuryfor the
Districtof Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607 (2002).
35 See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 50 (holding that granting broad jurisdiction to non-Article 111bankruptcy judges is unconstitutional); Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18
How.) at 284 (arguing that Congress cannot "withdraw from judicial [Article I] cognizance
any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or
admiralty").
36 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (quotations
and citations omitted).
37 See id. ("Article III does not confer on litigants an absolute right to the plenary consid-

eration of every nature of claim by an Article Ill court.").
38 See id. at 851-57 (1986).
39 E.g., Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
40 E.g., Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1858).
4' See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67 (1982).
42 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1892).
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is not whether Congress can take an Article III case and entrust it to
another federal adjudicative body; rather, the question is whether
Congress can authorize the adjudication in any forum of a "noncase"-in particular, these "non-cases"--outsideArticle 111. Congress
can grant federal courts and tribunals-within and without Article I-I-the power, as a matter of supplemental jurisdiction, to hear
claims, such as state law claims between citizens of the same state,
that fall outside the Article HI heads of jurisdiction. 43 And adjudicatory decisions outside the scope of adversarial "cases" are conducted
by executive officials daily. 44 Article IH does not impose an absolute
limit on the ability of Congress to grant judicial powers outside the
Article El heads to Article I bodies.45 However, there are a number of
reasons why Congress might be otherwise limited in its power to establish legislative courts to hear citizen suits, and these reasons are
the subject of this article.
Part II of this article will explore a number of arguments as to why
the constitutionality of citizen suit tribunals-even in non-Article Il
fora-is a close and vexing question under U.S. case law, at least
where binding judgments are to be issued and appellate review is necessary or desirable. Part III of this article will then look at two possible case studies, one domestic, and one foreign: the congressional
reference jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims and the
Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
This article will neither analyze the correctness of the Lujan standing model 46 nor take a position on the wisdom of permitting citizen
43 In Article 11 fora, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000) (granting supplemental jurisdiction over
state law claims to the U.S. district courts); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715 (1966) (granting same and upholding constitutionality, as a matter of common law). In nonArticle III fora, see Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986)
(upholding supplemental jurisdiction of state-law claims by the administrative Commodity
Futures Tradition Commission). Formally, of course, causes of action falling within the
supplemental jurisdiction of a court may be seen as part of the same "case" as the main cause of
action. More broadly, though, the availability of supplemental jurisdiction-given the right
procedural posture-suggests that the power of federal courts can in some circumstances extend
somewhat beyond the questions that a direct reading of Article 11] would imply.
4 See Bator, supra note 32, at 264-65 (discussing how executive branch officials must
regularly exercise effectively judicial power in applying their understanding of the relevant law
to their execution of it).
45 But see William A. Fletcher, The "Case or Controversy" Requirement in State Court
Adjudication of FederalQuestions, 78 CAL. L. REv. 263, 282-84 (1990) (arguing for a common
"case or controversy" standard in state and federal courts). The logical consequence of Fletcher's arguments---that limited Article II justiciability requirements should apply equally in state
and federal courts so as to preserve the integrity of judicial power and ensure the availability of
Supreme Court review-is that the same standard should apply in non-Article IH federal tribunals as well.
4 Compare Sunstein, supra note 1, with Harold J. Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizen Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1793 (1993).
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suits, within Article 1H courts or without. 47 Its sole focus is the constitutionality of assigning such suits (which Congress has for its own
reasons authorized from time to time) to Article I tribunals (which
Congress has likewise created, for other purposes). The ultimate conclusion of this article is that granting authority to adjudicate citizen
suits to Article I tribunals is constitutional even when the tribunals are
given the power to issue binding judgments. Prudential standing concerns mean that non-Article II tribunals should only hear "non-cases"
in the presence of a clear congressional command-but Congress is
free to give that command.
II. ARE CITIZEN SUITS IN ARTICLE I TRIBUNALS
CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE?

Even if standing is formally an Article Ell doctrine that does not
constrain legislative courts and similar non-Article IH tribunals directly, a number of other constitutional concerns plague any attempt
to grant citizen suit jurisdiction to a non-Article 1H1 tribunal.
Preliminarily, it is worth noting that the citizen suits in nonArticle HI tribunals are particularly suspect if citizen suit jurisdiction
is to extend to suits against nongovernmental actors.4a Citizen suits
against nongovernmental defendants implicate the individual rights of
those defendants, and thus there is a stronger argument for requiring
that they be conducted in a tribunal with Article III protections. Indeed, perhaps the most important aspect of the Article 1I standing
requirement is that it prevents private litigants from being haled into
court in the absence of a legal controversy with a particular plaintiff.
Defending against lawsuits is burdensome; it is probably inappropriate, if not unconstitutional, to require private parties to shoulder this
burden in the absence of a plaintiff who has suffered an alleged injury-in-fact at the hands of the defendant. The same concern does not
apply, however, to suits against the federal government and against
governmental actors who will be defended by the federal government.
Any protection that the United States might have against vexatious
litigation is Congress's to waive. Accordingly, this article will focus
on the prospect of a citizen suit tribunal whose purpose is to remedy
government action or inaction.

47 For an intriguing article suggesting that, at least some of the time, environmental citizen
suit provisions may do more harm than good, see Adler, supra note 17.
48 The suit in Laidlaw fell into this category. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw

Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 175-76 (2000) (describing Laidlaw as a nongovernmental
actor); see also infra Part H.E.
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Part I.A of this article addresses the foremost among the problems
that a non-Article EI citizen suit tribunal faces even if it is to adjudicate disputes involving governmental actors: whether it is constitutional for such a tribunal to issue a binding judgment. Although a
non-Article Ell citizen suit might result in a purely advisory, nonbinding declaration-in which case its constitutionality is fairly certain 49-Congress might also want to confer the power to issue binding
judgments, backed by the full coercive power of the government.
Part II.B of this article addresses a second important question that
arises if citizen suit tribunal decisions are to be binding: whether they
can receive appellate review in an Article H court. If so, the
constitutional concerns arising from a non-Article Ell tribunal might
be substantially alleviated.5 ° Parts ll.C and II.D of this article address
additional questions that arise as to whether Article II or other
separation of powers concerns pose an alternate barrier to hearing
citizen suit cases, questions that cut to the core of the United States
government's structure. 5t Finally, Part II.E of this article will suggest
that where citizen suits are against government officials rather than
private parties, they likely fall within the set of "public rights" that
may already be granted to non-Article 1I tribunals.52 Ultimately,
Article I citizen suits are viable, but Part II will examine each of the
potential issues in turn.
A. The Enforcement Problem-Cana Non-Article III Court Issue
Binding Orders?
The most serious problem facing any proposal to grant jurisdiction
over citizen suits to an Article I tribunal is the question of how---or
whether-that tribunal's judgments are enforceable. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that one factor supporting the constitutionality of an Article I adjudication is that the adjudication does not attempt to issue binding judgments. 53 There are two underlying argu49 See infra text accompanying notes 57-59.
50 See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 334-35 (1816) (arguing that

federal questions must be able to be heard in federal court, but that a hearing on appeal is adequate); infra note 73 and accompanying text.
51 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1967) (remarking that the terms "cases" and "controversies" have "an iceberg quality," containing "submerged complexities which go to the very
heart of our constitutional form of government").
52 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67 (1982) (discussing the "public rights" doctrine, which allows matters to be acted upon by the judicial
power); supra note 41.
53 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853 (1986). Writing
for the Court, Justice O'Connor contrasted the constitutionally-permissible Article I adjudications in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), and in Schor-both of which involved orders
that could only be enforced by action in an Article Ell district court-with the adjudication held
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ments. First, coercive power is dangerous-only Article RI courts,
with their guarantees of judicial independence, should have the power
to, for instance, imprison someone for contempt of court should they
disobey an injunction.54 Second, the power to issue binding orders is
an "essential attribute[] of judicial power" that Article II requires be
vested in Article IH courts. 55 The latter objection is one instance of
the limitations on Article I tribunals generally, discussed above. 56 The
former, however, poses a new problem: Does the Constitution require
that coercive action be undertaken only by the constitutionally independent Article 1H judiciary?
Conceivably, a citizen suit tribunal might be limited to purely advisory declarations, not backed by force of law but nonetheless useful
as an opportunity for litigants to air grievances before a neutral tribunal and perhaps difficult as a political matter for government actors to
ignore. 57 A government official losing a citizen suit would probably
be under significant political pressure to comply even without a formally binding order; many government officials would probably think

impermissible in N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. 50, which invalidated a scheme in which
non-Article III bankruptcy judges could issue coercive orders directly.
m See Fed. Mar. Comm'n. v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 761 (2002)
(contrasting the contempt power of courts with the inability of the Federal Maritime
Commission (FMC) to issue binding orders). Intriguingly, in this case, the Court found this
difference unavailing as to the question presented: whether a state agency should be entitled to
sovereign immunity in an administrative proceeding. Id. The Court emphasized the similarities
between Article I court proceedings and administrative adjudications, noting the procedural
safeguards that administrative proceedings, though falling outside of Article III, typically
possessed. Id. at 756-57 (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513-14 (1978)). One can
argue from FMC that Article I courts-being similar to Article m courts, and perhaps
possessing parallel safeguards against judicial overreaching-should be subject to the same
standing restrictions as Article III courts. The inference might point in the opposite direction,
however. standing requirements are intended to enforce separation of powers, not the rights of
litigants, and where procedural safeguards are statutorily available (as they might be in a
bindingly-adjudicating citizen suit tribunal), FMC suggests that there is little reason to withhold
power from a tribunal just because it has not been created under Article mI.For example, the
Court noted, with no apparent disfavor, the ability of administrative law judges to issue
subpoenas. Id. at 756 (citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 513).
55 See N. Pipeline Constr.Co., 458 U.S. at 81 (quotations omitted).
56 See discussion supra Part I.B.
57 By way of comparison, the U.S. Court of Claims functioned successfully for decades
without a guarantee that its judgments would be paid. See Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of
ClaimsAgainst the United States: The Evolutionfrom a Legislative Toward a JudicialModel of
Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625,659-60, 680-82 (1985). As a practical matter, the vast majority of
judgments were paid. Id. at 659-62. To this day, advisory judgments of the Court of Federal
Claims have no independent legal force, and there is no requirement that they be paid--they are
but recommendations to Congress-but as a matter of practice, most are. See infra Part IlA. Of
course, a suit requesting that funds from the treasury be paid out by Congress is not quite analogous to a suit demanding individual executive action: in the Court of Claims' case, the same
body that had established the tribunal as a matter of convenience-Congress-was being asked
to respect the tribunal's judgments.

2007]

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CITIZEN SUITS

twice before publicly proceeding with action adjudicated to be illegal.
And if defendant officials ignore a judgment of the tribunal, alternate
plaintiffs who do have an Article III injury-in-fact might still come
forward with an action of their own in an Article HI court, using the
tribunal's judgment for its persuasive effect. The risks and costs of
such a suit would probably be considerably lower than the risks and
costs of bringing an action for the first time. 58 Like advisory judgments of the Court of Federal Claims, the granting of such purely
advisory authority to an Article I "court" would probably be comparatively uncontroversial. 59
However, an Article I court with the power to issue fully binding
judgments would be a more complete replacement for the Article HI
citizen suits that Lujan precludes, and such an Article I court may yet
be possible. The presumption against letting Article I decision makers
issue binding judgments is not absolute. Article I legislative courts
have been granted the power to issue binding orders directly and enforce them by fine or imprisonment. 6° Indeed, Congress itself has the
ability to punish contempt to avoid the potential for political abuse.
This is typically accomplished by means of a criminal proceeding in
an Article III court, 61 but Congress retains the inherent power to punish contempt insofar as is necessary to carry out its functions.62 The
judgments of certain administrative agencies also become binding
automatically after a certain time. 63 Those that do not are typically
58Indeed, the granting of preclusive or nearly-preclusive effect to the decisions of nonArticle I adjudicators is well established; administrative factfinders are traditionally given
great deference in Article III enforcement proceedings. See Martin Redish, Legislative Courts,
AdministrativeAgencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197, 217 (citing
Local 13, Detroit Newspaper Printing & Graphic Commc'n Union v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 267, 272
(D.C. Cir. 1979)). Even if such preclusive effect is not afforded to the judgments of an advisory
citizen suit tribunal because it is not adjudicating "cases," the legal conclusions of the advisory
tribunal may have persuasive effect, and the fact that the case has been effectively litigated
already may reduce litigation costs to a potential plaintiff who does have standing and who
wishes to bring suit in an Article III court.
59 See infra Part III.A.
60 See 28 U.S.C. § 2521(b) (2000) (granting to the Article I Court of Federal Claims the
power "to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority as...
disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command").
61 E.g., 2 U.S.C. § 192 (2000) (making refusal to testify or produce papers in a congressional investigation a misdemeanor); Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U.S. 599 (1962) (upholding conviction for same).
62See Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 540-45 (1917). The Court distinguished punitive sanctions from those necessary to carry out the functions of Congress. Id. at 542. In the case
at hand, the petitioner was being held for having been "defamatory and insulting"; the Court
determined that punishment for such alleged offenses was beyond the power of Congress to
impose directly. Id. at 540, 545-46, 548. By way of contrast, the Court suggested that imprisonment of someone until such time as they agreed to testify would be constitutional. Id. at 54344.
63 For example, decisions of the Federal Trade Commission become binding automatically
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afforded great deference in subsequent enforcement proceedings, a
fact that one commentator has argued renders practically meaningless
the distinction between limiting the power of an adjudicator by requiring an Article m enforcement proceeding and simply allowing
appeals to be taken to an Article III court. 64 Furthermore, the District
of Columbia 65 and territorial courts, 6 6 though established by Congress
outside Article 111, are able to issue binding judgments.
Most broadly, that there is no blanket constitutional prohibition on
allowing tribunals without Article III protections to exercise coercive
authority is evident from the presence of state courts in the constitutional plan. 67 By definition, state courts lack Article III protectionsfor instance, their judges are often elected.68 Yet their decisions are
fully preclusive on the federal courts, 6 9 and they have concurrent jurisdiction over most federal causes of action. 70 Indeed, with a brief
exception in 1801, it was not until 1875 that federal question jurisdiction was granted to the federal courts-until then, state courts were
the exclusive forum for most federal causes of action.7 '
The acceptability of non-Article Ill state courts leaves open the
possibility that there is a unique constitutional problem with federal
tribunals created outside Article Ell. However, this possibility-at
least at its most absolute-is belied by the apparent acceptance of
Article I tribunals in the various other contexts discussed here.72 More
serious remaining challenges to the constitutionality of an Article I
citizen suit tribunal come from the issues that the next sections will
address: whether such a tribunal's judgments can be reviewable in an

if the period for filing a petition for review elapses. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(g) (2000).
6 Redish, supra note 58, at 216-19. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of whether and
when orders of a citizen suit tribunal might be appealable to an Article I court.
65 See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 375-76 & n.4 (1977) (describing the District of
Columbia court system and upholding criminal convictions by it).
66 See Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 516 (1828) (upholding judicial powers of
the territorial courts of Florida).
67 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing for concurrent jurisdiction in the state courts over federal questions).
68 See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2002).
69 See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95-96 (1980).
70 See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981) ("In considering
the propriety of state-court jurisdiction over any particular federal claim, the Court begins with
the presumption that state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction.").
71 Compare Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470, 470-71 (1875) (conferring federal
question jurisdiction on federal courts), and Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89 (1801)
(same), with Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 182 (1802) (repealing 1801 grant of federal
question jurisdiction). See generally STANLEY L KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND
RECONSTRUCTION POLTrrIcS 145 (1968).
72 See supra Part LB (discussing types of cases that can be, and are, placed in the jurisdiction of Article I tribunals).
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Article I court (which would be a significant, and perhaps
necessary, factor weighing in favor of their constitutionality) and
whether such a tribunal would raise independent separation of powers
problems.
B. The Ability to Appealfrom a Citizen Suit Tribunal to an
Article III Court
A great deal of authority suggests that an important reason why adjudications by non-Article HI decision makers is constitutional is the
availability of appeals to Article 111courts, particularly where constitutional defenses are implicated.73 The reviewability of decisions by
an Article I citizen suit tribunal thus becomes important to the constitutionality of such a tribunal, particularly if such a court is to issue
binding judgments.74 The question of appealability requires different
analyses in each of the two possible outcomes for an adjudication of a
claim: (1) a judgment for the citizen-plaintiff challenging government
action and ordering a government official to obey the law; and (2) a
judgment for the defendant government officials, whereupon the status quo is preserved.
A judgment for the citizen-plaintiff is the situation in which the
appealability concerns brought out by coercive judgments are important, because it is only in this situation that anyone is coerced by the
judgment of the court. However, one recent Supreme Court case,
ASARCO v. Kadish, suggests that even where original plaintiffs lack
standing in an initial citizen-suit lawsuit, the defendants affected by
an adverse judgment will have standing to appeal.75 Some state court
systems permit citizen suits, and in ASARCO, the Supreme Court confronted the problem of whether these suits can be appealed to Article III courts (in this case the Supreme Court) despite the plaintiffs'
lack of standing.76 The Court applied its test for standing not to the
original plaintiffs, but to the petitioners-state officials who had received an adverse judgment in the state court. The Court observed
73 See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 334-35 (1816) (arguing that
cases arising under federal question jurisdiction must be able to be heard in federal court either
originally or on appeal); Lawrence Gene Sager, ConstitutionalLimitations on Congress' Authority to Limit the Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REv. 17,70 (1981) (arguing
that where constitutional claims are concerned, the Article In federal courts cannot be completely deprived of jurisdiction). Cf Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d
Cir. 1948) (arguing that due process requires that deprivations of life, liberty, or property be
judicially reviewable).
74 If its judgments are non-binding, then any enforcement would have to be done in an Article [] court.
75 See ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989).
76 Id.
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that if it "were to agree with petitioners, [its] reversal of the decision
below would remove its disabling effects upon them.", 77 The Court
further held that the lower court decision constituted an actual injury.78 It thus concluded that the petitioners had standing, and that the
Court could hear the appeal. 79 A similar argument would likely apply
to defendants in a citizen suit tribunal who attempt to appeal an adverse judgment; ASARCO suggests that there would be no constitutional bar to their standing to appeal, and a statutory bar (which would
itself pose constitutional difficulties ° ) is 8 avoidable by means of an
appropriately drafted jurisdictional statute. '
In the second situation, a judgment for the defendants, no appeal
would be available; standing is as necessary on appeal as in an original suit.s2 A citizen-plaintiff lacking standing thus would be unable to
appeal an adverse ruling from a citizen suit tribunal in an Article III
court. Since that same citizen-plaintiff lacks any judicially cognizable
injury, the absence of a provision for review (in an Article 111 court or
otherwise) would be unlikely to raise any constitutional problems.8 3 If
there were constitutional difficulties in denying citizen-plaintiffs an
Article III forum in which to air their grievances, it would be anomalous indeed to systematically dismiss such suits for lack of standing
from Article III courts.
On the other hand, it is not clear whether ASARCO can be
extended this far. The ASARCO decision rested in part on the
importance of deference to and respect for state court judgments; the
Supreme Court found itself in the paradoxical situation of having to
choose between reviewing a case that, when initially brought, did not
meet Article Ill requirements, and having to vacate a state court
judgment rendered within the state court's rightful authority.8 Citing
its respective treatment of lower federal courts and state courts in the
Id. at 618-19.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 619.
77

80 See Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948); discussion
supraaccompanying note 73.
s Even without a direct appeal route, however, some of the constitutional difficulties
might be resolved by recourse to habeas corpus. Although habeas corpus applies only to deprivations of liberty, see 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000), amended by Acts of Dec. 30, 2005 and Jan. 6,
2006, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West 2006), "its historical core" is "as a means of reviewing the
legality of Executive detention," INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001), which is what a
detention imposed as a contempt sanction by a non-Article II tribunal would, in some sense, be.
8 See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997) ("The standing
Article III requires must be met by persons seeking appellate review, just as it must be met by
persons appearing in courts of first instance.").
83 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (dismissing citizen suit for
lack of standing).
84 ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 620-21 & n.1.
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mootness context, 85 the Court expressed resistance to the idea that it
could reasonably take the latter course and vacate the state court
judgment, given that the judgment was legal by the laws of the state
and that concurrent jurisdiction over federal questions is within the
"proper role" of state courts. 86 ASARCO thus rests, at least in part, on
federalism concerns that do not apply to an Article I federal citizen
suit tribunal: as to federal courts, the Supreme Court's role is
"supervisory," and there is no reason for the Court not to interfere by
taking an 87
appeal where the case could not have been brought under
Article III.
The force of this counterargument is significantly reduced, however, by the different postures of a lower Article IIl court and a hypothetical citizen suit tribunal. The reason why the Supreme Court takes
a "supervisory" role with lower federal courts, and does not hesitate
to vacate judgments in cases that fail to meet Article Il justiciability
requirements, is that lower federal courts are bound by Article I, and
the Supreme Court's role is in part to ensure that they correctly apply
Article 1Il's requirements. 88 In comparison, for the Supreme Court to
enforce Article III justiciability requirements on a non-Article I tribunal on the grounds that federal courts, unlike state courts, are bound
by Article II is to beg the question of whether non-Article Il tribunals are subject to those justiciability requirements. It is quite possible
that Article I courts, if so empowered by Congress, may issue binding
judgments in suits that do not qualify as "cases" under Article Ill. If
the only impediment to such judgments is the lack of Article I appellate justiciability, it would be paradoxical, or at least awkwardly
circular, to rule that such judgments are impermissible because of the
lack of appeals, but that appeals are impermissible because of the
impermissibility of the judgments. A simpler reading of ASARCO
might be to interpret the section on federalism as rightly distinguishing state courts from Article Il federal courts, but remaining silent as
to other federal adjudicators. Under this reading, while the federalism
rationale supporting Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in ASARCO
does not support appellate jurisdiction in a citizen suit tribunal, neither does it argue against appellate jurisdiction there. The other primary argument that the ASARCO Court made in favor of appellate
jurisdiction-that a losing defendant in the lower court might suffer
85 When the controversy has become moot, the Court's standard procedure is to vacate
lower federal court judgments and remand with instructions to dismiss, but to dismiss appeals
from state high courts and leave the underlying judgment undisturbed. Id. at 621 n.1.
86 d at 620.
87ld.at 621 n. 1.
88 See id. at 620-21.
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an actual injury-in-fact from an adverse 90binding judgment, even
89
where the plaintiff lacked one -still holds.
A second troubling aspect of extending ASARCO is the asymmetry
between losing citizen-plaintiffs, who cannot appeal, and losing defendants, who can. 9 However, a number of factors mitigate the effects of this seemingly bizarre result. First, the plaintiffs who are put
at a disadvantage are by definition not injured parties; they have suffered no constitutionally cognizable harm, and they may be assumed
to have entered the potentially-asymmetrical adjudication aware of
their risks. Second, to the extent that the asymmetry gives the citizen
suit tribunal an incentive to decide cases in one direction so as to
avoid appellate review, this incentive probably points in the lessdamaging direction, favoring a presumption of regularity and an assumption that the challenged regulations are legal.92 Finally, asymmetries in appellate proceedings are not completely alien to American
jurisprudence: most notably, when a criminal defendant wins at the
trial level, the government generally has no right to appeal.93 Thus,
although ASARCO is not as unambiguous as it may first appear, it
probably supports a right on the part of a losing citizen suit defendant
to appeal an adverse binding ruling, and this in turn puts any binding
rulings within the supervision of the Article Ell courts. The biggest
factor weighing in favor of the constitutionality of such judgmentsArticle Ell review-is thus likely available.

Id. at 618-19.
90 See also Brian A. Stem, Note, An Argument Against Imposing the Federal "Case or
Controversy" Requirement on State Courts, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 77, 101-08 (1994). Stern argued
that the core concern of ASARCO was upholding the separation-of-powers requirement that
Article m courts adjudicate only real cases between parties, but that this requirement is fulfilled-and the separation of powers concerns addressed-where a party has had its legal interests impinged by a binding adverse judgment, regardless of the standing of the original plaintiff.
Id. Stem distinguished Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986), which held that an adverse
judgment by itself is not enough to support standing on appeal, on the grounds that in Diamond
the defendant was an intervenor who suffered no actual legal injury when the side with which he
had aligned himself in the lower court litigation lost. Id. at 105-06.
91 See Fletcher, supra note 45, at 280-82. Professor Fletcher argued against the ASARCO
decision because it "makes appellate review available in a perversely asymmetrical way." Id. at
281.
921In contrast, Professor Fletcher's primary argument against the asymmetry in ASARCO
89

was that the presumption favored the wrong side in the state court context: state court judgments, he argued, are most in need of Supreme Court review where they have failed to strike
down a state law on federal grounds-the state of affairs where a citizen-plaintiff loses and the
judgment is unreviewable. Id.
93 E.g., United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 126-31 (1980).
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C. The Unitary Executive and the Take Care Clause
Another likely source for a limitation on the power of Congress to
create Article I citizen suit tribunals is the Take Care Clause of Article H.94 In addition to the core Article Il argument, Lujan itself rested
partially on an Article II argument.95 Writing for the Court, Justice
Scalia wrote that
[t]o permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers' compliance with the law into an
"individual right" vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief
duty, to "take Care
Executive's most important constitutional
96
that the Laws be faithfully executed.,
Professor Cass Sunstein has forcefully attacked this holding, arguing
that Scalia's insistence on a "'unitary executive' . . . free from interference by others" 97 is undermined by the clear availability of the
judiciary to "interfere" with executive action when a plaintiff who
does have a cognizable injury-in-fact-and thus standing-brings
suit.98 In Sunstein's view, the Article II critique of citizen standing
rests on the premise that "oversight of bureaucratic implementation
falls to the President, not to Congress or the courts"; 99 the problem
with citizen suits under this argument is that they represent an intrusion on the power of the executive to freely execute the law. °° Sunstein then dismisses the Article II argument, rightly pointing out that
there is no more interference with a challenged administrative agency
when a citizen plaintiff sues than when a plaintiff with an injury-infact-in the case of Lujan, perhaps just a plane ticket to go see endangered animals' 0 1-- does so. 102 If Sunstein is correct, the Take Care
Clause should have no impact on the ability of a citizen plaintiff to
challenge government action, whether in an Article I court or in an
Article I tribunal. The ability of courts to "interfere" with executive

94 "[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.
art. I, § 3, cl. 4.
95 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992).
96

U.S. CONST.

Id.

97 Sunstein, supra note 1, at 212 (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727 (1988)

(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
98 d. at213.
99 Id. at 212.
100See id. at 213.
MI0
See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 592 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
0
1 2See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 213.
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action by ordering
relief in ordinary Article Ill suits is well10 3
established.
There is a more subtle Take Care Clause argument against citizen
suits, however, that might still have some bite against them even in a
non-Article 1I tribunal: that they interfere not with the executive as a
defendant, but with the executive as a potential plaintiff. 0 4 According
to this view, which is probably at least part of the conception of the
Take Care Clause held by Justice Scalia, 10 5 the problem with citizen
suits is that they permit members of the public to serve as "private
attorneys-general" vindicating not individuated rights of a minority,
but the generalized interests of the majority.10 6
This sort of interference with the executive would pose difficulties
for citizen suits in Article I tribunals as much as for Article m tribunals, but it has certain weaknesses. Most notably, there exists a centuries-long history of private enforcement actions, including qui tam
and relator actions, which historically permitted plaintiffs with no
personal injury to sue in place of the government. 107 The Supreme
03

1

See id.

104See Lujan, 504 US. at 576 (arguing that "[vlindicating the public interest" is the prerogative of Congress and the Chief Executive). That Sunstein's understanding of the Take Care
argument is of the former type is evident from his conclusion that the Take Care concern is
"entirely inapplicable when the executive is not.., a party," as when the citizen suit is against a
private defendant. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 231. Sunstein makes passing mention of the possibility that the Take Care violation occurs when a suit interferes with prosecutorial discretion, but
dismisses that argument as "surely" lacking constitutional status. Id. at 231 n.300. But the interference with prosecution appears to be the more forceful concern: the argument is that only the
executive has the power to take care that laws are enforced by suing in parenspatriae on behalf
of a generalized public interest. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 706 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976).
One scholar has approached the relationship between prosecutorial authority and standing
from the opposite direction and argued that the ability of the United States to bring suit in criminal prosecutions undermines the claim that plaintiffs must be personally injured to have standing. Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal ProsecutionsShow
That Standing Doctrine Is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MiCH. L. REv.
2239, 2248 (1999). Interestingly, Hartnett's approach suggests an interpretation of the Article n
Take Care Clause that both undermines his argument and supports the constitutionality of Article I citizen suits. If standing is indeed an Article III doctrine that requires a plaintiff to have a
personal stake in litigation, the Take Care Clause might provide that stake with respect to prosecutions: as the official entrusted to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4, the President might under the Take Care Clause have just that personal
stake in vindicating the public interest, and only he or she would have the power to prosecute
"standing-less" criminal suits in the Article I courts to vindicate public interests. This conception of the Take Care Clause is an affirmative grant of standing rather than an independent
limitation on the power of others to sue, and therefore would not adversely affect the constitutionality of citizen suits outside Article III courts.
105See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705-06 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that independent
prosecutors represent an unconstitutional usurpation of the executive's authority to control
criminal prosecutions).
106See Krent & Shenkman, supra note 46, at 1800-01, 1805-08.
07
1 For example, in Steel Co., Justice Stevens cited a long American history of private
criminal prosecutions in nineteenth-century American state courts. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
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Court has upheld the Article III standing of qui tam relators, 0 8 and
although it avoided deciding their constitutionality under the Take
Care Clause, it held that this question was not "a jurisdictional issue"
that needed to be resolved before deciding the merits. 10 9 The consensus position on the Court seems to be that despite Justice Scalia's
discussion of Article II in Lujan,"10 even though standing jurisprudence "may sometimes have an impact on Presidential powers," the
jurisdictional question of whether a litigant has standing is decided
''11 Notably, perhaps,
under "Article Ell and not Article II.
Justice
Scalia's scathing attack in Morrison v. Olson on the power to vest
12
prosecutorial authority in independent prosecutors came in dissent.'
In summary, then, the Article II Take Care Clause might well pose
some obstacle to enforcement of the law by means of citizen suits in
non-Article I courts, but the scope of any such limitation is at best
uncertain.11 3 Citizen suits differ from qui tam actions in that the citizen-plaintiff lacks a personal stake altogether rather than, at least
formally, sharing in the recovery the government is owed. 14 On the
other hand, it is unclear whether this matters and whether it hurts or
helps the constitutionality of citizen suits; the petitions brought before
a citizen suit tribunal need not comprise suits that could also be
brought as criminal prosecutions, nor do they-as in the case of qui
tam actions-need to implicate the possibility of money rightfully
owed the government being paid to a private and uninjured complainant." 5 Article II may well prohibit at least some classes of citizen
suits in any type of tribunal, but it appears that at least some are permissible," 6 and in any case any prohibition appears to bar certain

Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 127-28 n. 15 (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
Professor Hartnett has also noted that at least in England, the extraordinary writs of prohibition,
mandamus, and certiorari could also be sought by any citizen, even one without a direct stake in
litigation. See Hartnett, supra note 104, at 2241 n.15.
108
Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 778 (2000).
1091d. at 778 n.8.
10 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992).
1 Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102 n.4.
112
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3
1 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 197 (2000)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that citizen suits, even where Article 1H standing is present, might raise Article II concerns, but refraining from deciding what they might be).
114Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765,772 (2000).
15 See id. (describing nature of recovered damages in qui tam actions); Laidlaw, 528 U.S.
at 197 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (expressing concern with the exaction of public fines by a
private litigant).
6
1 See Stephen M. Johnson, PrivatePlaintiffs,Public Rights: Article 1I and Environmental
Citizen Suits, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 383,418 (2001).
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(unspecified) relief rather than damaging the jurisdiction of any court,
in or out of Article El. "17
D. Other Separationof Powers Concerns
While Article II raises some concerns about citizen suits that
would apply equally to Article II and non-Article Ill fora, the unique
nature of non-Article III fora raises additional concerns that might not
apply under Article Il, even if citizen suits were possible in Article III courts. In several different contexts, the Supreme Court has
struck down clever legislative schemes in which Congress or a body
under its control attempted to maintain control over the enforcement
of legislation, 118 or alter the way in which legislation can be enacted
or repealed. 119 If, in general, it is the province of Congress to "make
all Laws ... necessary and proper" to wield the powers of the federal
government, 120 and of the President to "take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed,"' 12' separation of powers might dictate that the
powers to interpret legislation, to strike legislation down as unconstitutional,122 and to declare executive action illegal are reserved to the
courts.

These traditional powers of the judiciary cannot be exercised by
23
Congress, even as an incident to the Necessary and Proper Clause, 124
because all involve altering the effective scope of a validly enacted
statute, an action that is in effect similar to passing an amended law or
a repeal. 25 Read strictly, the Constitution might be interpreted to require that the only bodies that can perform these functions without
following the Presentment Clause 126 requirements are Article III deci117See Vt. Agency of Natural Res., 529 U.S. at 778 n.8.

18 See Metro. Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise,
Inc., 501 U.S. 252 (1991) (holding unconstitutional a requirement that an agency board comprise nine members of Congress); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding unconstitutional
the one-House legislative veto).
19 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (holding unconstitutional the
Line Item Veto Act).
120U.S. CONST. art. L § 8, cl. 18.
2
1 IU.S. CONST. art. 11,§ 3.
122 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."). It is worth noting that
many citizen suits against private actors would not implicate these concerns because in many
cases they would not involve challenges either to the constitutionality of a statute or the behavior of the executive; rather, the dispositive question would be whether the private actor factually
complied with the law.
123U.S. CONST. art. , § 8, cl. 18.
24
1 See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438 & n.28.
125See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952-54 (1982) (comparing the one-House legislative
veto of a decision by the Attorney General to the passage of a statute compelling a different
decision on his part).
126U.S. CONST. art. L § 7, cl. 2, (describing procedure by which a bill must be passed by
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127
sion makers whose constitutional role is to "say what the law is,'
not tribunals constituted as an exercise of congressional power. 128 But
such a strict reading is not accurate, because the executive itself
can-and, as a practical matter, must-interpret the scope of the laws
it applies and is free
to exercise discretion within the limits of their
29
1
language.
statutory
As a legislative body, Congress appears to be more limited in its
capacity to interpret the law. For example, even though every branch
of government has a duty to obey the Constitution, 130 it seems certain
that Congress itself could not decide that a previously-enacted statute
is unconstitutional and discontinue its effect, at least without a presidential signature effecting its repeal or a two-thirds vote to override a
presidential veto.' 3' If the power to declare statutes unconstitutional
and deny them future effect is an exclusive incident of the judicial
power granted by Article 1I, then Congress may lack the authority to
grant such power to a non-Article HI tribunal. Moreover, while the
ability of the judiciary to compel or enjoin executive action is well
established, at least when the executive's acts fall outside his or her
discretion,132 the Supreme Court has ruled unconstitutional attempts
by Congress to interfere directly with the implementation of enacted
statutes, such as the one-House legislative veto at issue in INS v.
Chadha.133 The majority in Chadha held that the one-House legislative veto represented, in effect, the unlawful passage of a law by one

both Houses and signed by the President, or passed by two-thirds majority by both Houses, to
become law).
127 Marbury,5 U.S. (ICranch) at 177.
128
For example, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, see infra Part I.A, was created to provide an efficient substitute for private bills brought before Congress requesting monetary relief.
See also Shimomura, supra note 57, at 648-62 (describing the historical process by which
Congress attempted to deal with claims against the United States).
'29SeeChevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) (describing the procedure for judicial review of administrative actions, in which the
agency must act as prescribed by law if the statute is clear, but can decide how to handle ambiguities and open questions itself so long as its answers are "permissible construction[s]" of the
statute).
0
13 See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180 (holding that "[C]ourts, as well as other departments, are bound by" the Constitution).
131See U.S. CONST. art. L § 7; Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1998).
Cf.City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (holding that only courts, not Congress,
have the
power to determine what constitutes a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
32
1 See Work v. United States ex rel. Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 177 (1925) (finding that writs of
mandamus "can not be used to compel or control a duty in the discharge of which by law [an
officer] is given discretion.").
133 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1982).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:2

House of Congress, without
acquiescence by the other house or ap134
President.
the
of
proval
However, the exact role of Article I courts in the constitutional
separation of powers is not as clear as that: 135 Article I courts are not
Congress. The term "Article I court" is perhaps misleading because
the term refers more to the source of authority for the court's creation36
than to the status of the court itself in the constitutional scheme.1
After all, Congress creates administrative agencies, empowered both
to perform administrative adjudications and execute the laws, under
its Article I authority, and yet these are rightly seen as part of the
executive.
Rather than assume that an Article I court's powers are coextensive with Congress's, perhaps a better approach would be to analyze,
first, the effect of granting power to an Article I court on the balance
of political power among the branches, 37 and second, the form, composition, and accountability of such a court compared to the bodies it
might supplant. 38 Under such an analysis, Article I courts fare relatively well. The one-House legislative veto that was ruled unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha represented an effective transfer of executive
power from Article H officials to Congress itself, and consisted of an
exercise of power by a component of Congress-a single House-not
intended to ordinarily exercise legislative authority at all. 3 9 Likewise,
the line-item veto ruled unconstitutional in Clinton v. City of New
York represented a significant shift in power from Congress to the
President, who for the first time could eliminate individual budget
items directly, and involved the ability of the President, a single individual, to interfere with the results of legislative bargaining among
representatives. 14 By contrast, Article I courts, at least as typically
constituted, are relatively independent bodies, which, like the Arti1

4

Id. at 952-54.

135See

Bator, supra note 32.

136See, e.g., Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 511 (1828) (finding that the legisla-

tively created courts in the pre-statehood U.S. territory of Florida could not be endowed with the
judicial power conferred by the United States Constitution regarding admiralty jurisdiction, but
could obtain such power through an act of the territorial legislature of Florida).
137See Chadha,462 U.S. at 945 ("Explicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution
prescribe and define the respective functions of the Congress and of the Executive in the legisla-

tive process." (emphasis added)).
138See id. at 948-52 (emphasizing the importance of bicameralism and analyzing the "legislative character of the one-House veto" in light of "the character of the congressional action it
supplants.").
139Id. at 462 U.S. at 948-51 (discussing the Framers' emphasis on bicameralism).
140Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). Note also the careful constitutional
reservation of power over budgetary matters to the House of Representatives specifically. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. I ("All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives .... ").
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cle IR judiciary, are not easily influenced by either the President or
Congress; 141 though they fail to guarantee the full panoply of Article 11Iprotections to litigants, they do not obviously tip the balance of
power among the branches in any particular direction. The dangers of
interference with executive power are lessened by the fact that Congress's powers are not increased.
Moreover, Article I courts exist today and are given the opportunity to nullify executive action. As a particularly active example, the
Tax Court regularly overturns decisions made by the IRS. 42 The reviewability of executive decision making by an Article I tribunal, far
from undermining the power of the executive, can be seen as an integral part of a legislative scheme as validly passed by Congress and
the Executive according to the "finely wrought and exhaustively considered . . . procedure" through which legislative power is exercised. 143 The presence or absence of standing is unimportant to this
analysis; either way, the actions of the executive respecting a statute
are, per the statute's own command, evaluated by an independent,
apolitical administrator in a forum that is judicial in character. If this
structure is acceptable for the Tax Court, it is difficult to see why it
would be more problematic for a citizen suit tribunal.' 44
E. The "Public Rights" Doctrine
A final argument in favor of the constitutionality of citizen suit tribunals arises from a way to view them as within the scope of decisions already committed to Article I tribunals: "public rights" cases. 145 Those citizen suits that are against the United States and challenge the validity of executive action or inaction would likely fall
within the rubric of "public rights," and would thus be amenable to
141See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 172, 176 (2000) (guaranteeing statutorily to Court of Federal
Claims judges a term of fifteen years, terminable only for "incompetency, misconduct, neglect
of duty, engaging in the practice of law, or physical or mental disability," and salary "at the rate
of pay, and in the same manner, as judges of the district courts").
142 See WitLLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 21 (13th ed. 2003). Of
course, Tax Court decisions, like other Article I decisions that countermand executive action,
are reviewable in Article fu courts, suggesting that the issue of Article III reviewability may be
dispositive in determining whether an Article I citizen suit tribunal is constitutional.
143Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
1'4 It is possible that under this view, the power to rule a statute unconstitutional would
stretch the limits of what could fairly be considered a part of the execution contemplated by the
statute itself. Or, perhaps, ruling on constitutional questions might be the special prerogative of
Article HI courts. If rulings as to the validity of a statute, as opposed to rulings as to the validity
of executive action under a statute, pose unique problems for an Article I tribunal, such jurisdiction can always be withheld from an Article I citizen suit tribunal without undermining the
tribunal's utility.
145N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67-76 (1982) (defining the "public rights" doctrine and applying it to the Bankruptcy Reform Act).
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adjudication by an Article I tribunal. Although the Supreme Court has
never clearly defined a "public rights" dispute, a very rough definition
would be a non-criminal matter between the government and a citizen
concerning the exercise of government authority.' 46 The canonical
example is a suit for money damages against the United States, 147 but
the category also includes disputes involving customs, 148 federal land
grants, 149 and immigration. 150 The legality of non-Article In tribunals
for public rights disputes is related to both sovereign immunity and
separation of powers; the category corresponds roughly with areas
where the choice of how to administer the law, and whether to grant
relief, was a prerogative of the political branches of government. 151
While suits for injunctive relief against executive officials have not
traditionally required a waiver of sovereign immunity,152 there is no
reason why such suits could not be styled as suits against the government in the presence of an appropriate waiver, and if they were,
would seem to fit within the "public rights" definition suggested by
Crowell v. Benson.'53 Furthermore, although the Constitution may
require the availability of Article Ill adjudication of suits alleging
government misconduct where constitutional concerns are implicated, 154 it is almost definitional that a plaintiff without an "injury-in-

146See id. at 67-68 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)).

147 See Exparte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 452 (1929).
48
1 See id. at 458.
49
1 See id. at 456.
150 See Fallon, supra note 34, at 967. Immigration cases are, however, also subject to habeas review, at least when they involve detention. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
151
See N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 67-68.
152See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
153
"[Tihe distinction is at once apparent between cases of private right and those which
arise between the government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments." Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932).
There is some tension between the public rights doctrine and the heightened importance of
judicial independence in suits against the government, and this tension argues against expanding
public rights beyond their historically supported, if illogical, contours. See N. Pipeline Constr.
Co., 458 U.S. at 68 n.20 ("Doubtless it could be argued that the need for independent judicial
determination is greatest in cases arising between the Government and an individual. But the
rationale for the public-rights line of cases lies not in political theory, but rather in Congress'
and this Court's understanding of what power was reserved to the Judiciary by the Constitution
as a matter of historical fact."). That said, even though the forum and thus the application of the
public rights doctrine are novel here, there is a strong argument that citizen suits fit within the
doctrine: they are effectively petitions requesting, as a matter of "sovereign grace," that the
political branches correct the error of their ways. Such a petition, like a request for money
damages paid from the public treasury, is a "matter[] that historically could have been determined exclusively by [the executive and legislative] departments." Id. at 68. For additional
discussion of the tension inherent in the public rights doctrine, see Redish, supra note 58 (criticizing the doctrine).
14See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988).
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fact" would lack an injury of constitutional magnitude. 155 In any case,
it does not follow that a suit brought before a non-Article Iltribunal
would 56be impermissible where the plaintiff chooses to bring it
there.'
III. CASE STUDIES

A. Advisory Opinions in the Court of FederalClaims: A U.S. Precedentfor Adjudicating "Non-Cases"

The claim that adjudication of disputes not falling within the Article 111 definition of "case or controversy" is constitutional when done
by non-Article III tribunals is bolstered by precedents demonstrating
that it has been done before. Trivial examples abound; because the
line between executive action and adjudication is of necessity a fuzzy
one, and administrative agencies must regularly make decisions that
are judicial in character, the power of non-Article 111 federal government bodies to wield judicial power outside the confines of "cases or
controversies" is clear, at least at the margins. 157 There also exists at
least one clearer precedent in the U.S. court system: the explicit jurisdictional grant to the U.S. Court of58Federal Claims to issue advisory
opinions at the behest of Congress.
The U.S. Court of Federal Claims is an Article I court 5 9 whose
primary purpose is to hear claims for money damages against the
United States government. 6 Such claims qualify as "cases or controversies" under Article III, as they are brought by a plaintiff who has
been injured in some way and is demanding money damages. Indeed,
in this core role, the Court of Federal Claims can only hear cases de55
1 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (defining an "injury-infact" as "an invasion of a legally protected interest").
156By way of comparison, the ability of plaintiffs to choose to litigate federal constitutional claims in state courts--non-Article In fora-is well established. E.g., Nevada v. Hicks,
533 U.S. 353, 366-67 (2001) ("Under our system of dual sovereignty, we have consistently held
that state courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate
claims arising under the laws of the United States. That this would be the case was assumed by
the Framers.") (quotations and citations omitted).
57
1 See supra note 44 and accompanying text; see also Resnick, supra note 34, at 619-20
(estimating that the life-tenured Article MIjudiciary is vastly outnumbered by administrative
law judges, "hearing officers," "examiners," and similar civil servants who carry on judicial
functions outside the formal and independent context of lawsuits as they are known in
Article 1I).
15828 U.S.C. § 1492 (2000) provides that "[a]ny bill, except a bill for a pension may be referred by either House of Congress" to the court "for a report in conformity with" procedures set
forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2509.
15928 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2000) ("The court [of Federal Claims] is declared to be a court established under article I of the Constitution of the United States.").
160
See The History of the United States Court of FederalClaims, http://www.uscfc.uscourt
s.govlUSCFChistory.htm (last modified June 4, 2001).
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manding monetary relief. 161 When hearing such cases, the court adheres to Article 111standing requirements, apparently on the statutory
interpretation ground that its appeals are intended to go to the Article 111 Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which is barred from
ruling one way or another on a purely advisory lower-court judgment. 162 However, the court has also been granted specialized juris63
diction to issue advisory opinions upon congressional reference.'
In the court's advisory capacity, bills-typically private bills for
monetary relief outside a preexisting statutory entitlement-are referred to the court by a resolution of either house of Congress. 164 The
court conducts what amounts to a full trial to determine the factual
merits of the claim for relief. 65 The procedures for holding such a
trial are incompletely specified and, at times, have been quite informal, 166 but typically follow more closely the pattern of any other litigation before the court. 167 Appeals, of course, cannot be made to an
Article III court; instead, the statute calls for the selection of a threejudge review panel from among the judges of the Court of Federal
Claims. 68 This panel reviews the findings of the trial judge designated as the hearing officer for the case, much as an appellate court
would review the determinations of a trial court. 169 The report of the
court is then returned to Congress, which is free to accept or ignore
the court's recommendations. 170 In practice, however, it almost always accepts the court's recommendations, even when there has been
161The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000), grants the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over "any claim against the United States ... for liquidated or unliquidated damages in
cases not sounding in tort." Certain collateral orders are permitted, for example directing restoration of a claimant to a position of federal employment, but no general grant to hear suits
demanding injunctive relief is given. See id. § 1491 (a)(2).
62
1 See Welsh v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 417, 420-21 (1983); see also Muskrat v. United
States, 219 U.S. 346, 361-63 (1911) (holding that Article II courts could not render advisory
opinions); Landmark Land Co. v. FDIC, 256 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the caseor-controversy requirement must be met in a suit in the Court of Federal Claims, without discussing63 the Article I status of that court).
1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1492 (2000).
164See id. § 2509(a); see also Jeffrey M. Glosser, CongressionalReference Cases in the
United States Court of Claims: A Historicaland Current Perspective,25 AM. U. L. REV. 595,
596-98 (1976).
165See 28 U.S.C. § 2509 (2000).
166See, e.g., In re Dep't. of Def. Cable Television Franchise Agreements, Nat'l Def. Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Section 823, 36 Fed. Cl. 171, 173 (1996) (holding a "nonadversarial" hearing "in a fashion similar to a congressional hearing or agency rulemaking
proceeding").
167
See Glosser, supra note 164, at 605-06.
16 28 U.S.C. § 2509(a) (2000).
169Land v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 231, 233 (1997). As in a typical trial court-appellate
court relationship, the legal conclusions of the hearing officer are reviewed de novo; the factual
findings are reviewed for clear error. Id. at 233-34; see also R. CT. FED. CL. app. D, para. 8.
17
oSee Kanehl v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 89, 96-97 (1997).
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an intervening election and the current Congress7 1openly admits that it
would not have referred the matter to the court.
In evaluating the feasibility of an Article I citizen suit tribunal,
several facets of this existing Court of Federal Claims process are
illuminating. First, and most broadly, the advisory opinions process is
a well-established example of "non-case" jurisdiction being granted
to an Article I court. The advisory jurisdiction of the court was first
granted over a hundred years ago. 72 Although the Court determined
in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok that the Court of Claims, the Court of Federal Claims' predecessor court, was an Article 1H court whose ability
to render advisory opinions was thus in doubt, 173 Congress soon updated the congressional reference statutes to refer cases not to Article Ill judges, but solely to Article I commissioners under their supervision.1 74 Consensus since then has been that this rendered the reference jurisdiction constitutional, 175 and today's arrangement-in which
the former commissioners of the Court of Claims have been reconstituted as the Court of Federal Claims, and what had been the Article
Um division was folded into a new Court of Appeals for the Federal
76-has
Circuitt
been ratified by the Supreme Court, at least implic77
1
itly.
A second facet worthy of mention is the apparent reasoning behind
the grant of advisory jurisdiction to a court-like, non-Article EIl tribunal: to bring many of the advantages of judicial resolution to a federal
"case" falling outside the scope of Article I heads of jurisdiction. As
the post-Glidden legislative history of the congressional reference
jurisdiction indicates, Congress wished to maintain a forum in which
171Glosser, supra note 164, at 627 (citing as an example S. REP. No. 1274, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 57 2(1974)).
1 See Bowman Act, 22 Stat. 485, 485-86 (1883) (granting Court of Claims reference jurisdiction from either house of Congress or from any executive department) (current equivalent
at 28 U.S.C. § 1492 (2000)); see also Alleman v. United States, 43 Ct. Cl. 144, 150-51 (1908).
173370 U.S. 530, 582 (1962) (noting that because the Court of Claims as then constituted
was an Article [[ court, its ability to render advisory opinions was in doubt, but not deciding the
constitutionality of doing so). See id. at 587 (Clark, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court of
Claims, if given further advisory references, should decline jurisdiction over them as incompatible with Article III).
74
1 Act of Oct. 15, 1966, 80 Stat. 958 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1492, 2509 (1970)).
75
1 See Shimomura, supra note 57, at 689 & n.533 (citing 2 W. COWEN, P. NICHOLS & M.

BENNETT, THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS 63 (1978) for the proposition that giving

congressional reference cases to the non-Article Ill commissioners rendered the arrangement
constitutional).
76
1 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Star. 25 (codified
in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1983)). See generally Shimomura, supra note 57, at 696-99
(discussing the post-1982 arrangement of the Court of Federal Claims and the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit).
" See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 n.23 (1982);
Shimomura, supra note 57, at 698 (discussing N. Pipeline).
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complex factual issues could be evaluated in an evidentiary, frequently adversarial proceeding by an independent and impartial tribunal. 178 These are values traditionally associated with Article Ill
courts; 179 in this instance where Article 111 courts are constitutionally
unavailable, Congress has turned to an Article I substitute.
A final facet, though, provides a potentially difficult contrast for
our proposed model of a citizen suit tribunal capable of issuing binding judgments: by definition, congressional reference cases are advisory and do not involve a binding judgment.' 80 Indeed, even though
hearing officers in reference cases can order discovery, issue subpoenas, and the like, such subpoenas are not enforceable by compulsory
judicial power, although comparable orders in non-advisory Court of
Federal Claims cases are enforceable. Instead, Congress has provided
that any failures to comply with court orders should be noted in the
final report to Congress. 18' However, unlike ordinary claims cases,
congressional references are not subject to Article III review in the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 82 and the non-self-enforcing
character of orders in reference cases avoids the constitutional difficulties that might arise from granting coercive powers to a nonArticle EIl body, without possibility of appeal to an Article III
court. 183 Moreover, there is no potential problem with interference
with the executive because no executive action is ever compelled. All
that is at issue is a possible outlay from the public fisc, which is unquestionably within Congress's authority,184 and even that is not fully
delegated in reference cases, only in ordinary claims actions.
Congressional reference cases, then, provide a suggestive model of
how a dispute falling outside the scope of Article III can constitutionally and practically be tried by an Article I tribunal, but do not resolve
all of the issues implicated by a proposal to try citizen suits challenging executive action in such a tribunal. The experience of other nations provides another model for citizen suit tribunals. The next Part
will discuss one of these examples, and will draw parallels to possible
experience in the United States.

78

See H.R. REP., No. 89-306 at 3-4 (1965); Glosser, supra note 164, at 605.
Resnick, supra note 34.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2509(e) (2000).
I Id. § 2509(0.
18 Compare id. § 2509 (sending reference cases, after consideration by the review panel,
directly back to Congress) with ia § 1295 (the jurisdictional statute of the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit).
3
18 See discussion supra Part ILA.
84
1 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 7, 9.
1

179See
180
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B. Standing in Citizen Suits in Australia
Although standing in United States federal courts is principally
treated as arising from Article 11[,185 the concept is a broader one that,
in various comparable forms, has found application in other common
law jurisdictions, 186 and even in some civil law ones. 87 The U.S. has
comparatively strict standing laws;1 88 where standing exists as a limitation in other common law jurisdictions, it189is frequently closely tied
to the grant of a substantive right of action.
Despite these differences, however, the problem of how to best accommodate challenges to regulatory action in the modern administra185 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) ("[T]he core component
of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of
Article II.").
18tE.g., Croome v. Tasmania, (1997) 191 CLR 119 (Australia); Thorson v. Attorney Gen.
of Canada, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138 (Canada); R. v. Paddington Valuation Officer (1966), 1 Q.B.
380 (England).
1STSee P. VAN DuK, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF GOVERNMENTAL AcTION AND THE
REQUIREMENT OF AN INTEREST TO SUE 130-52 (Sijthoff and Noorahoff) (1980) (discussing the
interest to sue requirements in recours pour excks de pouvoir suits, a method for challenging
ultra vires administrative action in France).
188 In the extreme, a number of countries place essentially no limits on who may bring suit
to correct allegedly illegal actions. India, for example, permits any concerned citizen to bring to
the Supreme Court's attention constitutional injustices in need of correction by letter as well as
by more formal suit:
This Court has on numerous occasions pointed out that where there is a violation of a
fundamental or other legal right of a person or class of persons who by reason of poverty or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position cannot approach a Court of law for justice, it would be open to any public spirited individual
or social action group to bring an action for vindication of the fundamental or other
legal right of such individual or class of individuals and this can be done not only by
filing a regular writ petition but also by addressing a letter to the Court.
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1086, 2. Some African countries permit suits
by any citizen to challenge the constitutionality of a statute. See Okey Ilofulunwa, Locus Standi
in Nigeria, http://www.hurilaws.org/HURlocusstandi-art.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2007)
(discussing ability to do this in Gambia and Ghana). Even England has occasionally permitted
suits by public interest organizations with no particularized injury to proceed in the discretion of
the court where the organization is better equipped to litigate than any of the parties actually
harmed. See R. v. Inspectorate of Pollution ex parte Greenpeace Ltd., [1994] 4 All E.R. 329
(EWCA Q.B.) (permitting Greenpeace to bring a challenge to the operation of a nuclear waste
processing plant because Greenpeace had the "expertise" to mount a "well-informed" legal
challenge).
199See, e.g., VAN DUK, supra note 187, at 71 (describing locus standi in English statutory
law as permitting suit only by those entitled to a statutory remedy). Cf Sunstein, supra note 1, at
173-79 (describing pre-New Deal standing law in the United States as following a similar
model).
Despite this standard approach in which those with a legal right would have standing to
uphold it, however, it was also apparently possible in the English tradition for unaffected third
parties to request the extraordinary writ of prohibition, so as to quash the purported jurisdiction
of tribunals that did not legally have jurisdiction. The theory was that anyone could sue to
vindicate this interest of the King's, and formally the suit was in the King's name; its granting
was discretionary. VAN DUK, supra note 187, at 48-49. Cf discussion supra note 107 (discussing private actions in both America and England).
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tive state while not overburdening the court system is common to
most jurisdictions today, and certain illuminating parallels can be
drawn. This Part will briefly examine the law of standing and a few
resulting legal developments in another English-speaking, federal,
common-law jurisdiction whose experiences shed particular light on
the citizen suit tribunal problem: Australia. Australia has a constitutionally imposed standing requirement parallel to (and derivative
from) that of the United States.' 90 It also has a specialized tribunal for
mounting challenges to government action outside of the normal federal court system, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, that provides
a ready model for how an Article I citizen tribunal might function.
It should be noted, by way of disclaimer, that this is not an attempt
to argue that the law of standing in the United States should or does
"conform to the laws of the rest of the world"; 191 rather, the point is
that, because a citizen-suit tribunal would be constitutional under
American law, it is instructive to observe whether, as a structural matter, such tribunals have been instituted abroad. The existence and
apparent success of the Australian system suggests that the U.S. Congress might find an Administrative Appeals Tribunal-with an expansive, non-Article III conception of standing-useful here.
1. Standing in Australia
Chapter III of the Australian Constitution sets out the constitutional basis for the Australian federal judiciary, which like Article III
of the U.S. Constitution provides for a high court and leaves to the
legislature the power to create lower courts. 92 Also like the U.S.
Constitution, it provides for a number of heads of jurisdiction, including what amount to diversity and federal question jurisdiction, in
which the federal courts may adjudicate.' 93 These heads of jurisdiction refer to "matters" that the courts have jurisdiction to adjudi95
cate, 194 which have been interpreted at various points to be identical
190

See Leslie Zines, Federal, Associated, and Accrued Jurisdiction,in THE AUSTRALIAN
FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 265, 265 (Brian Opeskin & Fiona Wheeler eds., Melbourne
University Press 2000) (discussing role of the U.S. Constitution in shaping the Australian
Constitution).
191Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing against
the application of foreign law to decide questions of U.S. constitutional law).
192See AUSTRALIAN CONST. ch. III, § 71. In Australia, the high court is known simply as
the High Court. Id.
193See id. §§ 73, 75-77.
194For example, the head of jurisdiction that best approximates what in the United States is
federal question jurisdiction provides as follows:
Additional original jurisdiction. 76. The Parliament may make laws conferring original jurisdiction on the High Court in any matter(i.) Arising under this Constitution, or involving its interpretation:
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or at least analogous tO19 6 "Cases" and "Controversies.'' 97 As in the
matter requirement in Australia serves to bar adviUnited States, 1the
98
sory opinions.
However, particularly in recent years, this latter bar has been
weakened significantly by the Australian High Court's increasingly
"relaxed approach" towards constitutional standing requirements.' 9 9
For instance, suits by Australian states challenging the
constitutionality of Commonwealth laws have been upheld, whether
or not specific state interests are alleged. 2° Indeed, in Truth About
Motorways v. Macquarie, the High Court specifically distinguished
the standing rules arising from the "matter" requirement from those
arising from the "case and controversy" requirement according to
Lujan, refusing to hold invalid a citizen suit provision in a federal
antitrust statute. 2 01 The Court did not, however, decide whether the
plaintiff had standing 20 2 nor did it clearly delineate the content of the
"matter" requirement. Instead, the Court appeared to adopt a
simplified viewpoint in which the conferral of a legal right by the
legislature-including to the public at large-was sufficient to grant
standing. 2 3 Despite this, the "matter" requirement is apparently not
completely devoid of content.2°

(ii.) Arising under any laws made by the Parliament:
(iii.) Of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction:
(iv.) Relating to the same subject-matter claimed under the laws of different States.
Power to define jurisdiction. 77. With respect to any of the matters mentioned [in
sections including the above, § 76] the Parliament may make laws(i.) Defining the jurisdiction of any federal court other than the High
Court:
Id. §§ 76-77.
195See Philip Morris Inc. v. Adam P. Brown Male Fashions Pty. Ltd., (1981) 33 A.L.R.
465 (Mason, J.) ("Th[e] formulation [of "matter"] does not depart from the American conception of 'cases' and 'controversies', notably that expressed by Field J in Re Pacific Railway
Commission and Smith v Adams...").
196See Henry Burmester, Limitations on Federal Adjudication, in THE AUSTRALIAN
FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 227, supra note 190, at 230-35.

CONST. art. III, § 2.
'"See In re Judiciary and Navigation Acts, (1921) 29 C.L.R. 257; Burmester, supra
note 196, at 235-45.
'99 Burmester, supra note 196, at 248-49; see also WHO CAN SUE? A REVIEW OF THE LAW
OF STANDING, Aust. Law Reform Comm., Disc. Paper 61, Oct. 1995.
20D
Burmester, supra note 196, at 248.
20 1
Truth About Motorways Pty. Ltd. v. Macquarie Infrastructure Inv. Mgmt. Ltd., (2000)
200 C.L.R. 591, 603.
202The procedural posture of the case meant that if the citizen suit provision was not unconstitutional, the case would be remanded without resolution of other issues. Id. at 601-603.
203
Id. Interestingly, this holding, and the modem English approach to standing where statutory cases are concerned, see supra note 189, bolster the argument that standing in the com197U.S.
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2. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal
Like the U.S., Australia also possesses an extensive administrative
state, including a system of federal tribunals established outside the
20 5
scope of Chapter III and its authorization to create federal courts.
Australia has one especially noteworthy tribunal with no direct United
States analog, however: the Administrative Appeals Tribunal
(AAT). 206 The AAT is a general tribunal intended to review the decisions of administrative officials and has jurisdiction over decisions
under hundreds of independent Commonwealth statutes that specifically provide for AAT review. 20 7 The tribunal's procedures are relatively informal; citizens who wish to complain can petition by letter
as well as by formal application.0 8 Its constitutionality is uncontroversial. 20 9 Appeals from the AAT to the (Chapter III) Federal Court

mon-law tradition flows from the existence of a cause of action, and that the American separation of injury-in-fact from the cause of action is misguided and ahistorical. See Sunstein, supra
note 1, at 166; see also William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 23839 (1988) (arguing that the question of standing should collapse to the question of whether the
plaintiff can state a cause of action). If this theory is correct, then Lujan was incorrectly decided,
and raw citizen suits should be seen as constitutional even in Article Il courts so long as Congress confers a substantive cause of action to the citizens at large. This debate is beyond the
scope of this article. As an interesting aside, the primary clause used by the MacquarieCourt to
distinguish the American Article III from the Australian Chapter 1I was AUSTRALIAN CONST.
ch. 3, § 75(v), which provides original jurisdiction for the High Court to issue extraordinary
writs and injunctions against federal officials. This was seen by the Macquarie Court as evidence of the Australian Constitution's concern for granting the judiciary power to curb unlawful
executive action, and according to the Court the clause was inserted into the Australian Constitution specifically to avoid a result analogous to that in Marbury v. Madison. 200 C.L.R. at 633
(Gummow, J.). The Court also cited the availability of extraordinary writs to all citizens. See
discussion supra note 189. What this analysis seems to miss-with curious logical consequences-is that Marbury represented only the Supreme Court's lack of original jurisdiction to
issue a writ of mandamus, not the exclusion of such authority from the American conception of
Article M judicial power as vested in the lower courts. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 175-76 (1803).
204At a minimum, suits still need to attempt to vindicate the legal right of some party; unless the legislature explicitly grants a legal right to the entire populace, citizen standing is still
precluded. See Macquarie,at 169 A.L.R. 619-20.
205
See Margaret Allars, Federal Courts and FederalTribunals:Pluralism and Democratic
Values, in THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 191, supra note 190, at 204-09.
2

06See Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Austl.).
207See Administrative Appeals Tribunal JurisdictionList, available at http://www.aat.gov.
au/LegislationAndJurisdiction/JurisdictionList.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2007).
20
8See Applying to the AAT, http://www.aat.gov.au/ApplyingToTheAAT/WhenCanThe
AATHelp.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2004).
209See Allan v. Transurban City Link Ltd., (2001) 183 A.L.R. 380, 383 (Austl.).
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are permissible on issues of law, 210 and the tribunal has the power to
211
issue at least some binding orders.
Of particular concern to this article is the role of standing at the
AAT. When other legislation provides for it, the AAT may give advisory opinions. 212 However, the AAT's core purpose is to assist those
aggrieved by an adverse decision of some kind, and its jurisdictional
statute reflects this assumption, permitting review of specified decisions upon application to the AAT by anyone "whose interests are
,,213
The import of this phrase is a matter of
affected by the decision.
some controversy. In Allan v. Transurban City Link, the High Court
faced the appeal of a pure citizen suit from the tribunal. Allan, a citizen who no longer lived in an area affected by a highway construction
project, had attempted to challenge the legality of its licensing.21 4 The
majority opinion did not directly confront the question of constitutional or statutory standing in the AAT. Rather, the Court held that
the substantive cause of action was unavailable to the plaintiff under
the particular statute in question, and thereby ultimately affirmed the
AAT's decision that Allan lacked standing to bring the challenge. 1 5
However, Judge Kirby wrote an intriguing dissent-most of which
was not in contradiction to anything the majority held-analyzing the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act and standing requirements in
detail.2 1 6 On the issue of how the "matter" requirement affects standing in the AAT, he wrote:
Once one moves from the commencement of proceedings in a
federal court, where the constitutional necessity of demonstrating the existence of a "matter" imposes some constraints
on the law of standing, substantial scope for permitting the initiation of tribunal proceedings by a broader range of persons
in a wider range of circumstances, is available to the federal
lawmaker. The tendency of federal legislation is to move
away from authorising only particular persons (such as ministers, statutory agencies or officers) or persons limited by a
controlling adjective ("aggrieved", "interested"), to "any person" (as now appears in several federal laws). This tendency
2 10
See Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 § 44 (Austl.). The question of whether
an appellant might have standing at the Tribunal, but not standing in the Federal Court, has
apparently not been addressed.
211See id.
212
See id. § 59.
21
3See id.§ 27.
214
Allan, 183 A.L.R. at 382-83.
2 15
Id. at 388-89.
216
Id. at 392-96 (Kirby, J., dissenting).
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adds to the need for caution about approaching the issue of
"standing" as if it always presents a generic problem. In one
sense it does. But the solution to the problem in a particular
case must always take as its starting point the language and
structure of the legislative prescription in question.217
Judge Kirby thus concluded that there are no constitutional limits on
standing in the AAT, and that only the implementing legislation matters. 218 He then advocated a generally liberal approach to interpreting
that legislation, taking into account the potential inconveniences to
regulatory objects from liberalized standing rules, common sense, and
the danger of "intermeddlers., 219 In addition, Judge Kirby emphasized
the need for flexibility in the modem administrative state and the fact
that, should standing rules prove too expansive, Parliament could
always take some or all jurisdiction away from the tribunal.22 °
3. Lessons for the United States
In short--despite its still-incompletely-defined status as a forum
for citizen suits-the AAT provides a model of what a citizen suit
tribunal in the United States might look like. Although Australia's
more-liberal approach to standing and overt rejection of Lujan does
minimize the High Court's concerns with the effects of broadly
construing AAT jurisdiction, the essential constitutional position of
the AAT is comparable to an Article I court. Like an Article I court,
the AAT is not a creature of the ordinary federal judicial power and is
probably not bound by its limitations, but it is acceptable nonetheless
because of the needs and structures of the modem administrative
state. The possibility of review of matters of law, whether to the
Federal Court or to a U.S. Court of Appeals, mitigates the
independence concerns that one might have with vesting such power
outside Article/Chapter 1H.221
Judge Kirby's analysis of how some notion of standing might still
be incorporated into citizen suits by a tribunal might also find an analog in the United States. Above and beyond constitutional standing
requirements, U.S. courts have adhered to concepts of prudential
217
21

Id. at 393 (Kirby, J., dissenting).

8Id. at 395-96 (Kirby, J., dissenting).

219/d .
2M

Id.

221Compare Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act (Austl.) 1975 § 44 (permitting appeals

from the AAT to the Federal Court on matters of law only) with Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22
(1932) (permitting apparently final determination of non-jurisdictional facts by an administrative tribunal, without review by an Article iMIcourt).
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standing. 222 In the context of an Article I tribunal, such rules would be
presumptive; the Supreme Court has indicated that, as doctrines of
federal common law, they can be freely overridden by Congress.223
But as background rules, they echo some of the elements of Judge
Kirby's balancing tests: both sets of rules include, for example, an
analysis of the intended beneficiaries of a statutory cause of action, 224
a concern with intermeddlers,225 and a sensitivity to the competences
of the tribunal.2 26
IV. CONCLUSION

Australia provides a remarkable opportunity for comparative law
studies in the area of federal courts because the structure of its federal
court system so closely approximates our own and because its judges
so often use United States law as a reference. Through the prism of
Australian experience, we can see the possibility for an American
judicial experiment: a tribunal freed from the constraints of Article 1I
to adjudicate regulatory disputes of public concern, and empowered
to develop procedures that admit aggrieved private litigants, but also
better equipped to adjudicate complex regulatory disputes than an
27 Such an experiment need not be broad in scope.
ordinary court. 227
One advantage of the AAT model is that though it has become a court
of generalized jurisdiction, its jurisdiction is still granted on a statuteby-statute basis, and the nature of the disputes it adjudicates is such
that jurisdiction can be withdrawn completely if necessary.228 Such
would be the case here, too.
222 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464,474 (1982).
223Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
224Compare Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 475 (requiring that plaintiffs fall
within the zone of interests created by statute), with Allan, 183 A.L.R. at 392-93 (Kirby, J.,
dissenting) (advocating a close reading of the enacting statute).
225Compare Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 475 (denying standing to those
whose claims are based on the legal rights of private third parties), with Allan, 183 A.L.R. at
391 (Kirby, J., dissenting) (discussing "intermeddlers").
226Compare Warth, 422 U.S. at 499-500 (discussing competence of courts to adjudicate
generalized public issues), with Allan, 183 A.L.R. at 395-96 (Kirby, J., dissenting) (discussing
flexibility
of legislative solutions and procedures to accommodate the modem regulatory state).
227
See Fuller, supra note 30, at 394-404 (arguing that the traditional adversarial system is
ill-equipped to handle problems, called "polycentric," with complicated effects on a multiplicity
of parties). See also supra Part LI.A (discussing the ability of the Court of Federal Claims, in
advisory cases, to hold informal hearings in which a number of non-adversarial parties can
present evidence); supra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing the ability of the AAT to
initiate informal proceedings by letter).
228However, the large number of statutes that confer AAT jurisdiction suggest that the experiment has been working, or at least has been perceived to work, in Australia. See AdministraAppeals Tribunal Jurisdiction List, supra note 207. Also promising is the fact that the
tive
tribunal has been mimicked in Australia at a more local level. See Administrative Appeals
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Although the U.S. Supreme Court might well balk on separation of
powers grounds, Article Ut appears to create no barrier to the establishment of such a tribunal under Article I, and the problems of enforceable judgments and appealability appear to be solvable. We alor
ready have one Article I tribunal hearing disputes that are not cases 229
capacity.
advisory
purely
a
in
albeit
El,
Article
under
controversies
In sum, an Article I citizen suit tribunal may or may not be helpful or
prudent, but it is constitutionally permissible, and so whether it is
helpful or prudent is for Congress to decide.

Tribunal Act of 1989 (Austl.) (creating an administrative appeals tribunal for the Australian
Capital Territory).
229See discussion of the Court of Federal Claims' advisory opinion jurisdiction, supra
Part III.A. Indeed, the Court of Federal Claims might well be a reasonable forum for an initial
grant of citizen suit jurisdiction.

